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Current Account Deﬁcits in the 
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In 2000–01 the current account deﬁcit of Portugal reached 10 percent
of its GDP, up from 2–3 percent at the start of the 1990s. These deﬁcits
are forecast to continue in the 8–9 percent range for the indeﬁnite future.
Greece is not far behind. Its current account deﬁcit in 2000–01 was equal
to 6–7 percent of GDP, up from 1–2 percent in the early 1990s, and again,
the forecasts are for deﬁcits to remain high, in the 5–6 percent range. 
This is not the ﬁrst time that some of the small member countries of the
European Union have run large current account deﬁcits. In the early
1980s, for example, Portugal ran deﬁcits in excess of 10 percent of GDP.
But those deﬁcits had a very different ﬂavor from today’s: Portugal then
was still reeling from its 1975 revolution, from the loss of its colonies,
and from the second oil shock; the government was running a large bud-
get deﬁcit, in excess of 12 percent of GDP. The current account deﬁcits
were widely perceived as unsustainable, and indeed they turned out to be:
between 1980 and 1987, the escudo was devalued by 60 percent, and the
current account deﬁcit was eliminated. In contrast, Portugal today is not
suffering from large adverse shocks; the ofﬁcial budget deﬁcit has been
reduced since the early 1990s (although with some signs of relapse in
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1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 1472002, as current estimates imply that Portugal may exceed the limits
imposed by the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact among the countries par-
ticipating in European monetary union); and ﬁnancial markets show no
sign of worry. 
The fact that both Portugal and Greece are members of both the Euro-
pean Union and the euro area (the group of countries that use the euro as
their common currency), and the fact that they are the two poorest mem-
bers of both groups, suggest a natural explanation for today’s current
account deﬁcits. They are exactly what theory suggests can and should
happen when countries become more closely linked in goods and ﬁnan-
cial markets. To the extent that they are the countries with higher
expected rates of return, poor countries should see an increase in invest-
ment. And to the extent that they are the countries with better growth
prospects, they should also see a decrease in saving. Thus, on both counts,
poorer countries should run larger current account deﬁcits, and, symmet-
rically, richer countries should run larger current account surpluses. 
This paper investigates whether this hypothesis indeed ﬁts the facts.
We conclude that it does, and that saving rather than investment is the
main channel through which integration affects current account balances. 
We proceed in four steps. First, we use a workhorse open-economy
model to show how, for poorer countries, goods and ﬁnancial market inte-
gration are likely to lead to both a decrease in saving and an increase in
investment, and so to a larger current account deﬁcit. We also discuss
how other, less direct implications of the process of integration, such as
domestic ﬁnancial liberalization, are likely to reinforce that outcome. 
Second, we look at panel data evidence from the countries of the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since
1975. We document that the recent changes in the current account bal-
ances of Portugal and Greece are indeed part of a more general trend: the
dispersion of current account positions among OECD countries has
steadily increased since the early 1990s, and current account positions
have become increasingly related to countries’ income per capita. This
trend is visible within the OECD as a whole but is stronger within the
European Union, and stronger still within the euro area. The channel
through which this occurs appears to be primarily a decrease in saving—
typically private saving—in the countries with widening current account
deﬁcits, rather than an increase in investment. 
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the recent history of these two countries is largely consistent with the
ﬁndings of the panel data regressions. Lower private saving—due to both
internal and external ﬁnancial market liberalization but also to better
future growth prospects—and, to a lesser extent, higher investment
appear to be the main drivers of the larger current account deﬁcits. 
We end by taking up two issues raised by our findings. First, we relate
our results to the large body of research triggered by what has been
called the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: the finding of a high cross-country
correlation between saving and investment. We show that, consistent
with our findings, this correlation has substantially declined over time in
this sample of countries, especially within the euro area. At least for this
last group, the Feldstein-Horioka phenomenon appears to have largely
disappeared. Second, we discuss whether the current attitude of benign
neglect vis-à-vis the current account in the euro area countries is appro-
priate, or whether countries such as Portugal and Greece should take
measures to reduce their deficits. We conclude that, as a general rule,
they should not. 
Current Account Balances and Economic Integration
A country that wants to borrow from the rest of the world must take
into account two things: the interest rate it faces, and the price cuts it will
need to make to generate sufﬁcient export revenue to repay the debt. In
this context, increased ﬁnancial integration, which brings about a lower or
a ﬂatter cost of borrowing, clearly makes it more attractive to borrow.
Increased goods market integration, which leads to a more elastic demand
for the country’s goods, decreases the price cuts required in the future and
so has a similar effect. Thus, in response to increased integration, bor-
rower countries will want to borrow more. And, by a symmetric argu-
ment, lender countries will want to lend more. The distribution of current
account balances will widen.1
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1. An earlier example of the effects of economic and monetary integration is that of
Puerto Rico’s integration with the rest of the United States in the early postwar period.
Ingram (1962) provides a classic analysis of what happened—an analysis made feasible by
the continued collection of statistics on ﬂows even after integration. Between the early and
the late 1950s, as a result of increased ﬁnancial integration, net annual private capital
1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 149The purpose of the model described below is to formalize this argu-
ment. The model is straightforward but will be useful in organizing the
empirical work and discussing some of the policy and welfare issues
raised later in the paper.2
Think of a group of n countries trading goods and assets among them-
selves. (For convenience, we will sometimes refer to this group of coun-
tries as “the world,” but what we have in mind is the set of countries
within the trading group.) Each country produces its own good, but
households in each country consume the same composite good. 
Households live for two periods and maximize utility: 
where consumption in each period is given by
and the intertemporal budget constraint is given by
In the last equation P is the price of the good produced by the country, in
terms of consumption, and R is the interest rate, also in terms of con-
sumption, or the consumption interest rate for short. 
The parameter σ in the above identity is the elasticity of substitution
among goods, which to satisfy the Marshall-Lerner condition is assumed
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inﬂows into Puerto Rico from the rest of the United States jumped from 3 percent to 11 per-
cent of Puerto Rico’s GDP. Half of these inﬂows came in the form of direct investment, and
the rest in the form of long-term borrowing by local banks; both of these sources of exter-
nal ﬁnancing had been virtually nonexistent before the mid-1950s. Investment meanwhile
increased from 16 percent to 20 percent of GDP. Puerto Rico’s current account deﬁcit with
the rest of the United States widened even more, reaching by 1958 a stable level of 12 per-
cent of GDP, and reﬂecting not only an increase in investment but also a decrease in saving.
In a later essay, Ingram (1973) used the experience of Puerto Rico to suggest that a Euro-
pean monetary union would free member states from the link between national saving and
investment. Our paper can be seen as testing Ingram’s hypothesis.
2. An early model of the evolution of the current account along these lines was devel-
oped by Fischer and Frenkel (1974). An overlapping-generations version was later ana-
lyzed by Dornbusch (1983).
1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 150to be greater than 1. The parameter x is a wedge between the world con-
sumption interest rate and the rate at which a country can borrow. (We are
considering here a borrower country.) For the time being, we take produc-
tion as exogenous. Thus movements in the current account reﬂect only
saving decisions. 
With logarithmic preferences, consumption spending in the current
period is given by
Deﬁne ca as the ratio of the current account balance to national income.
Then ca is given by
The three terms in the expression in brackets on the right give the
determinants of the current account balance:
—Output growth. The ﬁrst term is equal to 1 plus the rate of growth of
domestic output. The higher output is next period relative to this period,
the larger the current account deﬁcit will be. 
—The interest rate. The second term gives the effect of the interest rate
faced by the country. The higher the consumption interest rate, or the
greater the wedge, the more expensive it is to borrow abroad, and thus the
smaller the current account deﬁcit. 
—The rate of change in the terms of trade. The third term is equal to
1 plus the rate of change in the price of the domestic good in terms of
consumption. The larger the fall in the price of the domestic good
required next period to sell enough domestic goods to pay down the debt,
the more expensive it is to borrow, and thus the smaller the current
account deficit. 
This equation provides the right starting point to show the effect of
integration on the current account balance of a country that, like Portugal
and Greece, is poorer than its trading partners but catching up. Assume
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1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 151to world variables.3 Assume also that all other countries are fully inte-
grated, thus facing the same interest rate R (with no wedge). 
Under these assumptions, sum the ﬁrst-order conditions for the con-
sumer’s problem [1/Ct = R(1/Ct+1)] over countries. Use the fact that aggre-
gate consumption is equal to aggregate income to get
where Y* is the average world level of output, and g* is the world rate of
output growth.
Noting that the demand for the good produced in a given country is
given by 
and correspondingly for Pt+1, we can express the current account as
So, if output growth in the country we are considering exceeds the output
growth of its trading partners, and the borrowing wedge x is not too large,
the country will run a current account deﬁcit. 
Using this expression, we can now return to the effects of integration
on the current account balance. For countries such as Greece and Portu-
gal, economic integration has had three main dimensions: the single Euro-
pean market, which mostly affected the product market; the integration of
ﬁnancial markets within the European Union; and ﬁnally monetary union,
with the adoption of the euro in the late 1990s. All three channels have
clearly worked in the direction of potentially widening the current
account deﬁcits of these countries. 
Since the early 1990s, the single European market has led to an
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3. This assumption is easily relaxed, but at some cost in increased algebraic complex-
ity. Relaxing it introduces an additional effect, the dependence of the slope of the supply of
funds on n, the number of trading partners. The larger n, the smaller the effect of borrowing
by the country on the equilibrium consumption interest rate, and so the ﬂatter the supply of
funds to the country. This provides another dimension of integration, namely, as an
increase in n.
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ment of competition rules across the European Union, factors such as the
harmonization of safety requirements for products and the extension of
distribution networks have led to goods being closer substitutes (either in
product or in geographic space), and thus to a higher elasticity of demand
for each good.4 As a result, goods market integration has reduced the
adverse terms-of-trade effect a country faces when it needs to generate a
current account surplus to repay its debt, and this has made borrowing
more attractive. Going back to the expression above for the current
account, assume that the country in question has a higher growth rate than
its trading partners, so that it is running a current account deﬁcit. Then,
the higher σ, the larger the deﬁcit. 
Financial integration has led to a decrease in the wedge x within the
European Union. Beyond the elimination of capital controls and other
explicit barriers to ﬁnancial ﬂows, the harmonization of ﬁnancial market
rules within the European Union has reduced the regulatory uncertainty
faced by foreign lenders and has improved the transparency of informa-
tion on potential borrowers. Thanks to the European Union’s “single
passport” legislation (the 1993 EU Investment Services Directive that
addressed the cross-border activities of all types of ﬁnancial ﬁrms), an EU
bank that wishes to do business in another member state no longer needs
to set up a full subsidiary and be subject to local regulation and supervi-
sion. It can do business there by opening a branch or, even more simply,
by operating directly from its home base, where all the key aspects of its
solvency, liquidity, and risk are supervised by its home regulator. In par-
allel, the harmonization of ﬁrms’ reporting requirements has improved
information and decreased the risk faced by foreign lenders. Also, as
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Olivier Jeanne have emphasized,5 by
increasing the cost to governments of expropriating foreign lenders and
investors, ﬁnancial integration has decreased the risk of expropriation and
thus the risk premium that lenders and investors require. 
Monetary union has led to a further decrease in x within the euro area.
Monetary union has eliminated currency risk. Foreign exchange risk
among the countries of the European Monetary System had already
Olivier Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi 153
4. In our speciﬁcation, σ was formally introduced as a taste parameter. Think instead of
our speciﬁcation of utility as a reduced form reﬂecting the higher substitutability of prod-
ucts, for whatever reason.
5. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002).
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eliminated the most obvious cases of overvaluation. Still, the cost
incurred by some investors and ﬁnancial institutions during the crises in
the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992–93 remained in the memory of
market participants. This lingering uncertainty was only really eliminated
in the late 1990s, as adoption of the euro became a near certainty. The
elimination of currency risk increases the relative importance of other ele-
ments of risk. Credit risk has become the most important component of
the pricing of a security within the euro area, with the implication that the
relative quality of underlying credits, rather than judgments about the sta-
bility and volatility of currencies, drives securities prices. All of this obvi-
ously makes the “national” dimension of capital ﬂows increasingly fuzzy.
Finally, monetary union has led to larger and deeper markets for speciﬁc
ﬁnancial instruments, such as euro bonds; we shall see examples of this
when we return to the cases of Portugal and Greece. 
So far we have focused only on saving, but it is straightforward to
introduce investment and build on this simple structure. The results can
be easily expressed in words: 
—Allow production to depend on capital, and take a country that is
poorer (in the sense of having less capital, and thus a higher marginal
product of capital) than the others in the group. How much investment
takes place will depend both on the cost of borrowing and on the future
terms of trade: the lower the relative price of domestic goods in the future,
the less attractive it is to invest in the production of domestic goods. Then,
for very much the same reasons that economic integration is likely to lead
to a decrease in saving, it is likely to lead to an increase in investment.
Rather obviously, to the extent that ﬁnancial integration leads to a lower
cost of ﬁnance, investment will increase. It will also increase to the extent
that goods market integration leads to an increase in the elasticity of
demand for domestic goods: the higher the elasticity of demand, the
smaller the decrease in price needed to sell the additional output in the
future, and so the more attractive investment is this period. 
—To the extent that investment increases, this will lead, both directly
and indirectly, to a larger current account deﬁcit than in our model above:
directly, as the increase in investment is only partly offset by an increase
in saving, and indirectly, to the extent that higher investment leads to
faster expected growth (an increase in g relative to g*), higher real income
in the future, and so lower saving this period. 
154 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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—Poorer countries are poorer not only because they have less capital,
but also because they have lower total factor productivity. Again, the evi-
dence is that both goods market integration and ﬁnancial market integra-
tion are likely to lead, in particular through higher competition, to an
increase in total factor productivity.6 To the extent that this is the case, it
is likely to improve growth prospects in poorer countries and lead to a fur-
ther decrease in saving.
—Financial integration often comes, at least in part, with domestic
ﬁnancial liberalization. New instruments, such as more-ﬂexible mort-
gages, may be introduced. To the extent that this is the case, and that
domestic ﬁnancial liberalization leads to lower saving, the effect of inte-
gration on the current account will be reinforced. 
To summarize, ﬁnancial market integration and goods market integra-
tion are likely to lead, in the poorer countries, to both a decrease in saving
and an increase in investment, and so to a deterioration in the current
account balance. How much of the adjustment takes place through lower
saving, and how much through higher investment, depends among other
factors on the relative roles of capital and total factor productivity in
explaining differences in income per capita across countries, and on the
relative roles of ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial liberalization. 
The Widening of Current Account Balances: 
Evidence from Panel Data
Having laid out a simple framework, we now return to the data, not
only for Portugal and Greece but also for the OECD in general and the
European Union and the euro area in particular. To organize the discus-
sion, we typically present results for four groups of countries: 
—OECD minus. This group consists of all OECD countries except the
Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Turkey, and the Central Euro-
pean nations (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak
Republic), for a total of twenty-two (out of thirty current OECD mem-
bers). The reasons for omitting these eight countries vary. The mecha-
nisms behind changes in current account balances in Korea, Mexico, and
6. See, for example, the ﬁndings of a recent McKinsey report on France, Germany, and
the United States in the 1990s (McKinsey Global Institute, 2002).
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the richer OECD countries. Data for the Central European countries exist
only from 1990 on, and so these countries cannot be used when con-
structing a balanced panel (we brieﬂy report the results from unbalanced
panel regressions below). Finally, the economy of Luxembourg is highly
idiosyncratic; in particular, Luxembourg consistently reports current
account surpluses on the order of 30 percent of GDP. 
—The European Union. This group consists of the current members of
the European Union, again excluding Luxembourg, or fourteen countries
in all. The rationale for looking at this subgroup of OECD countries is
obvious. If integration is the basic force behind the widening of current
account balances, one would expect the effect of the single market to be
much stronger for the EU countries than for OECD countries in general. 
—The euro area. This group consists of the countries that have
adopted the euro as their common currency, again excluding Luxembourg
but including Greece, which joined in 2001, for a total of eleven. The
rationale for looking at this group is equally obvious. With the ﬁxing of
parities in 1999, and the actual shift to the euro at the end of the 1990s,
one would again expect the degree of integration to be stronger among
these countries than for the broader EU grouping or, a fortiori, the OECD
countries in general. 
—Euro minus. This is the set of countries just deﬁned minus Greece
and Portugal, or nine countries in all. The reason for looking at this sub-
group is simply to see whether the results obtained for the euro area are
due to these two countries or hold in the rest of the euro area as well. 
To start, ﬁgure 1 reports, for each group, the standard deviations of
member countries’ current account balances as a percentage of GDP for
each year from 1975 to 2000. Data on current account balances (and later
on saving and investment) are from the European Commission’s Annual
Macroeconomic Database of the Directorate General for Economic and
Financial Affairs (AMECO). The data are based on countries’ national
income accounts and, since 1995, on the EU accounting system ESA95.
The numbers do not always match those published by the OECD, which
are sometimes based on other sources (for example, the OECD current
account data for Greece are based on Bank of Greece data, which are con-
structed using mainly bank settlement data rather than trade data). The
differences can be nonnegligible: in 2000 the current account deﬁcit of
Greece was 4.5 percent of GDP according to the European Union, and
156 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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ences in the levels and not in the changes, and the conclusions below are
roughly unaffected by which series we use.7
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7. A larger issue is whether we should look at the current account balance or the change
in the net foreign asset position, which, in principle, includes changes in valuations of
Figure 1. Cross-Country Standard Deviations of Current Account Balances 
for Selected Country Groups, 1975–2000
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission Annual Macroeconomic Database of the Directorate General for
Economic and Financial Affairs (AMECO).
a. All current OECD members except the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, the
Slovak Republic, and Turkey.
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groups described above. The time series have three characteristics: 
—The results are similar across the three groups; indeed, there is no
more evidence of increasing dispersion of current account balances for
either the euro area or the European Union than for the OECD minus
group as a whole.
—There is a sharp but temporary increase in the standard deviation in
the early 1980s.
—There is a steady increase in the standard deviation since the late
1980s, leading to a more than doubling of this measure over the last ﬁf-
teen years. 
A further look at the data suggests a sharp difference between the
short-lived increase of the early 1980s and the steady increase later on.
The increase of the early 1980s is entirely due to large deﬁcits in just two
countries, Portugal and Ireland. As the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 shows,
when these two countries are left out of the data for the euro area, the peak
of the early 1980s completely disappears, and the standard deviation rises
more or less steadily from the early 1980s on, with a sharper increase in
the 1990s. We have already brieﬂy discussed the 1980s episode in Portu-
gal, which was a period of very large and unsustainable deﬁcits due to the
aftermath of the revolution, the loss of colonies, the second oil shock, and
a loss of control of ﬁscal policy. In Ireland, the combination of the oil
shock and a ﬁscal expansion (with ﬁscal deﬁcits exceeding 12 percent of
GDP) also led to very large and unsustainable current account deﬁcits. 
The next step is to try to explain which countries have been running
larger deﬁcits and which have been running larger surpluses. Basic
growth theory and the open-economy model presented in the previous
section suggest exploring the relation between income per capita and the
current account balance. Countries that are poorer have more potential for
catch-up, through either capital accumulation or technological progress.8
158 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
assets and liabilities. Because of the measurement issues associated with available series
for changes in net foreign assets, we prefer to use the series for the current account balance.
For the set of countries we look at, the general trends we describe below are robust to
whether one uses current account balances or changes in net foreign asset positions. For
more on the relation between the two series, see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a).
8. For empirical evidence on convergence within the OECD, see, for example, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
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thus to run larger current account deﬁcits. 
We take a ﬁrst pass at the data in ﬁgure 2, which presents scatterplots
of individual country averages of the current account balance as a per-
centage of GDP against income per capita, for two subperiods, 1985–93
and 1994–2000, and three different groups of countries. Income per capita
is GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in 1985 dollars.9 The choice
of 1985 as the starting date for the ﬁrst subperiod is to avoid the episode
of the early 1980s described earlier. Regression results are as follows
(with t statistics in parentheses; these results are also displayed as regres-
sion lines in each panel of ﬁgure 2):
OECD minus
1985–93: CA/GDP = –1.8 + 0.09 Y/NR 2 = 0.01
(1.5)
1994–2000: CA/GDP = –6.8 + 0.49 Y/NR 2 = 0.13
(5.2)
European Union
1985–93: CA/GDP = –1.9 + 0.12 Y/NR 2 = 0.03
(2.0)
1994–2000: CA/GDP = –11.8 + 0.94 Y/NR 2 = 0.48
(10.2)
Euro area
1985–93: CA/GDP = –2.8 + 0.23 Y/NR 2 = 0.10
(3.4)
1994–2000: CA/GDP = –13.5 + 1.10 Y/NR 2 = 0.58
(11.0).
The ﬁgure and the associated regressions have two striking features.
First, there is a substantial strengthening of the relation between the cur-
rent account and income per capita from the ﬁrst to the second subperiod.
Except in the euro area, the coefﬁcient is typically insigniﬁcant for
1985–93; it becomes much larger and very signiﬁcant in 1994–2000. Sec-
ond, the increase is stronger for the European Union than for the OECD as
a whole, and stronger for the euro area than for the European Union
Olivier Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi 159
9. Data are from the Heston and Summers database up to 1992 and are extrapolated
using real GDP growth rates thereafter.
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Figure 2. Average Current Account Balances and Income per Capita, 
Selected Country Groups, 1985–2000
Sources: AMECO and data from Alan Heston and Robert Summers, Penn World Tables (pwt.econ.upenn.edu).
a. Current account balances are expressed as a percentage of GDP.
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nomically signiﬁcant). 
Both features are quite consistent with the idea that integration is an
important factor in the evolution of the current account balance. Integra-
tion was higher to start with within the European Union and the euro area
than in the OECD as a whole and has continued at a faster pace. To look
at the relation further, we examine the following speciﬁcation: 
In this rather standard speciﬁcation,10 the ratio of the current account
balance to output in year t for country i depends on a common time effect,
on the level of income per capita in year t for country i relative to the
average level of income per capita in year t for the group of countries
under consideration (Y/N)t, and on other control variables included in the
vector Xit. The only nonstandard aspect of the speciﬁcation, and the one
central to our exploration here, is that we allow the effect of relative
income per capita to vary from year to year. 
In our basic speciﬁcation we use two control variables (in addition to
the time effects). The ﬁrst is the dependency ratio, constructed as the ratio
of population to the labor force: other things equal, we expect a country
with a relatively higher dependency ratio to save less. The second is the
rate of growth of output from year t – 1 to t, included to capture cyclical
effects of movements in output on the current account. The theory we out-
lined earlier suggests that integration may also affect the elasticity of the
current account with respect to cyclical movements; for this reason we
also allow the effect of output growth to vary from year to year. (The
results are nearly identical if we use the measure of the output gap con-
structed by the OECD, which aims at capturing cyclical movements in
output.) The period of estimation runs from 1975 to 2001. The starting
year is constrained by the availability of comparable data on saving,
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10. For recent surveys and extensions of the literature of the determinants of current
accounts, see, for example, Debelle and Faruqee (1996) and Chinn and Prasad (2000).
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mated coefﬁcients bt against time. The top left panel of ﬁgure 3 shows
such a plot for OECD minus. The coefﬁcient is nearly always positive,
but there is no obvious trend. In other words, the widening of the distribu-
tion of current account balances does not appear to reﬂect an increased
dependence of the current account on the level of income. 
The top right panel of ﬁgure 3 does the same for the European Union.
Here the pattern of the estimated coefﬁcients over time resembles that of
the standard deviation of the current account balance in ﬁgure 1. The high
deﬁcits of the early 1980s in both Portugal and Ireland, two relatively
poor EU countries, lead to a temporary increase in the coefﬁcient. One
also sees a steady increase in the coefﬁcient from the late 1980s on. By
the mid-1990s the coefﬁcient becomes both statistically and economically
signiﬁcant. The estimated coefﬁcient of 0.2 in 2000 implies that, other
things equal, for a country with an income per capita 40 percent below the
EU average (roughly the case for Portugal and Greece), the ratio of the
current account balance to GDP should be 8 percentage points lower than
the EU average. (In 2000–01 the current account for the European Union
was roughly balanced, and the deﬁcit for Portugal was, as we have seen,
roughly 10 percent of GDP.)
The bottom left panel of ﬁgure 3 plots the same coefﬁcients for the euro
area. These coefﬁcients look very much the same as those for the European
Union—not a great surprise given the large overlap between the two
groups. Finally, the bottom right panel shows the results for the euro minus
group, to assess the inﬂuence of Portugal and Greece. The increase in the
coefﬁcient is actually larger in the 1990s when Portugal and Greece are left
out: the coefﬁcient reaches 0.35 in 2001. 
In short, ﬁgure 3 suggests that, for the European Union, the widening
of current account positions can be largely accounted for by an increased
dependence of the current account balance on income per capita. The
effect seems weaker, if present at all, for the OECD. And there is no
strong evidence of an additional euro effect. 
To explore the robustness of these results, we have examined a number
of alternative speciﬁcations. One such speciﬁcation is motivated by the
idea that income per capita may be a poor proxy for what we are trying to
capture. Although convergence of income per capita appears to hold for
the set of countries we are looking at, some of the poorer countries may
have a bleak future. Some richer countries may be more appealing to for-
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with risk characteristics; think, for example, of the United States and its
long string of current account deﬁcits.11 This suggests replacing income
per capita in our regressions with the initial net asset position of the coun-
try, again interacting its coefﬁcient with time.12 Presumably, if a country
has been borrowing steadily in the past, so that its asset position is nega-
tive, it has characteristics that are attractive to foreign investors. Further
ﬁnancial and economic integration are then likely to allow for more for-
eign inﬂows, and thus larger current account deﬁcits. 
Figure 4 shows the set of estimated coefﬁcients from a regression in
which foreign assets per capita in 1990 rather than income per capita is
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11. This theme has been explored, both theoretically and empirically, by Ventura
(2002) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b).
12. For more on the relation between foreign asset positions and income per capita, see
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a).
Figure 3. Yearly Coefﬁcients of Current Account Balances on Output per Capita
from Panel Regressions, 1975–2001
Source: Authors’ regressions discussed in the text using data from AMECO and from Penn World Tables.
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Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and are in millions of dol-
lars.13 (Regressions using either foreign assets per capita in 1980, or for-
eign assets per capita for each year, give very similar results.) Because the
level of foreign assets can be positive or negative, we cannot use the same
normalization as for income per capita; we use instead the difference
between foreign assets for country i in year t and the average for the rele-
vant group of countries in year t. 
The main conclusions we draw from ﬁgure 4 are twofold. First, the
coefﬁcients are typically positive: countries that have borrowed in the
past tend to run current account deﬁcits. This conclusion has been well
documented by others. Second, there is, however, no evidence that the
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13. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a).
Figure 4. Yearly Coefﬁcients of Current Account Balances on Foreign Assets 
per Capita from Panel Regressions, 1975–2001
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tion has become stronger over time. For the OECD minus, the coefﬁcients
are typically signiﬁcant but show no trend. And for the European Union
and the euro area the trend is clearly in the other direction, with a steady
decrease in the coefﬁcient over time.
Another alternative speciﬁcation is motivated by the fact that the cur-
rent account reﬂects the behavior not only of private saving and invest-
ment but also of public saving. Unless Ricardian equivalence holds,
public saving is likely to affect total saving, and thus the current account.
And one of the principal trends of the 1990s has been, as a result of the
1992 Maastricht Treaty, a strong improvement in the ﬁscal positions of
most EU countries. 
We therefore explored a speciﬁcation that adds another control vari-
able to the basic speciﬁcation, namely, the ratio of the structural primary
government balance (as constructed by the OECD) to GDP for each year
and each country. The results are easy to summarize. For all four groups
of countries, the coefﬁcient on the ﬁscal variable is tightly estimated and
very signiﬁcant. For the OECD as a whole, an increase in the structural
primary balance of 1 percent of GDP leads to an improvement in the cur-
rent account of 0.2 percent of GDP. The estimates are nearly identical for
the European Union and the euro area. But the time series of the estimated
coefﬁcients on income per capita is nearly identical to that in ﬁgure 3 (and
therefore we do not report them here). In other words, the increased
widening does not appear to stem from a divergence in levels of public
saving across countries. 
A third alternative specification adds to the sample the EU accession
countries—those countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are candi-
dates to join the European Union—on grounds that this could in principle
provide an excellent test of our hypothesis: these countries are poorer
than the current EU members, expect to grow rapidly after joining, and,
in preparation for entry, have undergone some internal liberalization and
have started to remove some barriers to economic integration. The prob-
lem with these countries is, as already mentioned, that the necessary data
are unavailable before the early 1990s. When we include these countries
in the regressions reported above, rerun over the much shorter sample
period, the results confirm those presented above. This is hardly surpris-
ing, because most accession countries ran large current account deficits
in the 1990s: the average ratio of the current account balance to GDP for
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1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 1651993–2001 was –3.6 percent for the Czech Republic, –4.9 percent for
Hungary,  –3.7 percent for Poland, and –5.0 percent for the Slovak
Republic.
Saving or Investment? 
Finally, we turn to the question of whether the increased dependence of
current account balances on income per capita reﬂects an increased
dependence of saving or an increased dependence of investment. To
address this question we simply reran the basic speciﬁcation, replacing
the ratio of the current account to GDP ﬁrst with the ratio of saving to
GDP and then with the ratio of investment to GDP. Figure 5 shows the
results of the saving regressions. We draw two conclusions:
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Figure 5. Yearly Coefﬁcients of Saving on Income per Capita 
from Panel Regressions, 1975–2001
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icant effect of income per capita on saving, and no evidence of a trend.
Saving appears to be unrelated to the level of income per capita. The coef-
ﬁcient tends to be negative (lower income per capita leads to higher sav-
ing) for most of the 1980s, and close to zero for most of the 1990s, and the
value for 2001 is roughly equal to the value for 1975. 
Second, for both the European Union and the euro area, there is much
clearer evidence of a trend. After a sharp decline in the 1970s, the coefﬁ-
cient steadily increases over time, both in the 1980s and in the 1990s.
Interestingly, the coefﬁcient also changes sign: at the start of the sample,
saving is negatively related to income per capita—the opposite of what
the standard open-economy growth model predicts. The relationship turns
positive in the late 1980s, and the coefﬁcient becomes larger in the euro
area than in the European Union. Integration per se does not easily
explain the change in sign, and this suggests the presence of other factors
at work, such as ﬁnancial development or ﬁnancial liberalization. Poorer
countries have introduced new ﬁnancial instruments and institutions,
which may have led to a decrease in saving. This, combined with integra-
tion, may have led to larger current account deﬁcits. 
Figure 6 shows the results of the investment regressions. We again
draw two conclusions. First, the coefﬁcient is typically negative: a lower
income per capita is associated with higher investment, as predicted by
the standard model. 
There is, however, no evidence of a trend toward a more negative
effect of income per capita on investment over time. (The coefﬁcient
steadily decreases starting in the mid-1990s, but this decline is too small
and too recent to qualify as a trend.) In short, the increased dependence of
current account balances on income per capita reﬂects, for the most part,
an effect through saving rather than an effect through investment. 
The importance of the effect through saving suggests the relevance of
trying to separate the effects of integration and internal ﬁnancial liberal-
ization. With this in mind, we explored the effects of introducing as an
additional control the ratio of M3 (a broad money measure) to GDP; this
ratio is often taken as a proxy for the stock of debt instruments available
to ﬁrms and households, and thus as a proxy for ﬁnancial deepening.14
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14. See, for example, King and Levine (1993) for a use of this ratio as a measure of
ﬁnancial development in standard growth regressions.
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related to the ratio of M3 to GDP, suggesting that internal ﬁnancial liberal-
ization does play an independent role in determining the cross-country dis-
tribution of current account balances. The effect is both statistically and
economically signiﬁcant: an increase in the ratio of M3 to GDP of 30 per-
centage points (as happened, for example, in Greece in the 1990s) is esti-
mated to lead to a decrease in the ratio of the current account to GDP of
about 1.2 percentage points. But introducing this additional control does
not signiﬁcantly affect the coefﬁcients on relative income per capita.
Back to Portugal and Greece
Panel data regressions can only take us so far; often one gets a better
sense of the underlying mechanisms by looking at individual countries.
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Figure 6. Yearly Coefﬁcients of Investment on Income per Capita 
from Panel Regressions, 1975–2001
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1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 168This is what we do in the present section, where we return to the experi-
ences of Portugal and Greece.
Portugal 
Figure 7 shows Portuguese investment and saving, as ratios to GDP,
from 1985 to 2001. It clearly shows the steadily increasing divergence
between the two, and the resulting steady increase in the current account
deﬁcit, starting in the 1980s. 
In trying to assess how much of the change in the current account
deficit is due to a change in saving or to a change in investment, one
must be careful in the choice of a base period. The early 1990s in Portu-
gal was a period of slow growth for cyclical reasons and so is not the
right base period. Thus in table 1 we divide the data into three subperi-
ods. The first is 1985–91 (1985 was the first year after stabilization,
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Figure 7. Portugal: Investment and Saving, 1985–2001a
Source: AMECO.












1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 169following the large fiscal and current account deficits discussed earlier;
1991 was the last year of sustained growth). This subperiod saw an aver-
age annual growth rate of GDP of 5.1 percent. The second is 1992–95, a
period of slow growth and therefore unusually low investment and sav-
ing, with an average annual GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent. The third is
1996–2001, a period of sustained growth averaging 3.5 percent a year.
Finally, to show what has happened recently, we also present numbers
for 2000 and 2001, when GDP grew by 3.3 percent and 1.9 percent,
respectively. The far right-hand column reports the differences in the
numbers from the 1985–91 subperiod, which we take as the base period,
to the 2000–01 subperiod. 
The data for public, private, and household saving underlying the num-
bers in table 1 are adjusted for inﬂation. More speciﬁcally, using informa-
tion about the composition of public debt by currency denomination, we
add to the ofﬁcial number for public saving an amount equal to inﬂation
times the proportion of the public debt denominated in domestic currency
times the debt. (The adjustment matters very much, as annual inﬂation
decreased from an average of 14 percent over 1985–91 to 7 percent over
1992–96 and 3.5 percent since; the average ratio of public debt denomi-
nated in domestic currency to GDP has remained stable at around 50 per-
cent.) We subtract a similar amount from private saving, and so leave
unchanged the ofﬁcial number for the current account. This amounts to
assuming that all public debt denominated in domestic currency is held
170 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002




Item 1985–91 1992–95 1996–2001 2000–2001 2000–01
Current account  0.6  –2.0  –7.0  –10.0  –10.6
Investment 25.3  22.8  26.6 28.1 2.8
Saving 25.9  20.8  19.5  18.1  –7.8 
Public 4.6  2.3  2.6  2.4  –2.2
Private 21.3  18.5  16.9  15.7 –5.6
Household 9.2  8.3  5.7  5.4  –3.8
Corporate 12.1  10.2  11.2  10.3  –1.8
Sources: European Commission, Statistical Annex of European Economy, Spring 2002; data from the Direccão Geral de
Estudos e Previsão.
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public debt, no obviously better adjustment is feasible.15
Allocating the inﬂation adjustment for private saving between house-
hold and corporate saving is much more difﬁcult.16 It depends, for exam-
ple, on whether government bonds are held by households or ﬁnancial
intermediaries and, in the latter case, on the types of liabilities issued by
these intermediaries. Further adjustments should also be made for corpo-
rate bonds and other nominal corporate liabilities and for mortgages and
other nominal household liabilities. We could not obtain sufﬁcient data to
do these adjustments.17 Therefore we instead use a simple rule: we sub-
tract the full inﬂation adjustment on government debt from household
saving. This implicitly assumes that all public debt is held (directly, or
indirectly through intermediaries with nominal liabilities) by households
rather than corporations. Again, in the absence of relevant data, one has
little choice but to make that assumption. We make no adjustment for
other nominal liabilities. 
Figure 7 and table 1 suggest four conclusions:
—The increase in the current account deﬁcit dates back to the late
1980s but accelerated in the second half of the 1990s. When 1985–91 is
used as the base period, the current account deﬁcit has increased by
10.6 percent of GDP. 
—Less than one-third of the increase in the current account deﬁcit is
due to an increase in investment. The ratio of investment to GDP has
increased by 2.8 percentage points relative to 1985–91. The increase is
much larger (5.3 percentage points) if we compare the ratio to its value in
the early 1990s, but much of that increase is cyclical, reﬂecting the slow
growth of that period. 
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15. Estimates from the Bank of Portugal for the 1990s indicate that the proportion of
government debt held by nonresidents remained low until the mid-1990s (when the inﬂa-
tion adjustment matters most): it was 10 percent in 1990 and still only 17 percent in 1996.
Since then the proportion has increased steadily, reaching 47 percent in 2001.
16. For a recent exploration of the mineﬁelds associated with the construction of
economically meaningful series for household saving in the United States, see Gale and
Sabelhaus (1999).
17. Estimates from the Bank of Portugal for the 1990s indicate that at least 80 percent
of the government debt held domestically was held either by households or by ﬁnancial
institutions with nominal liabilities on the liability side.
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due to a decrease in saving. The ratio of saving to GDP has decreased by
about 7.8 percent of GDP relative to its 1985–91 value. 
—The decrease in saving reﬂects primarily a decrease in private sav-
ing. Public saving has decreased by 2.2 percent of GDP relative to
1985–91; private saving has decreased by 5.6 percent of GDP. (Inﬂation
accounting is important here: without the inﬂation correction, public sav-
ing would show a rise of 3.1 percent of GDP, and the decrease in private
saving would be a much larger 10.9 percent of GDP.)
—The decrease in private saving reﬂects primarily a decrease in house-
hold saving. The ratio of household saving to GDP has decreased by
3.8 percentage points, and the ratio of corporate saving by 1.8 percentage
points. (Without the inﬂation correction, household saving would show a
decrease of 8.3 percent of GDP.)
We now look at some aspects of the story behind these numbers. Take
the decrease in household saving ﬁrst. From 1995 to the end of 2001,
household debt increased from 40 percent to 93 percent of GDP. Most of
this increase took the form of either mortgages or consumer loans from
banks. At the end of 2001 mortgages represented 39 percent of total bank
loans to the nonﬁnancial private sector and 76 percent of total loans to
households. 
Why has there been such an increase in household debt? We could not
ﬁnd substantive changes in the types of ﬁnancial products, mortgages or
loans, offered by banks. The decrease in interest rates must be a central
part of the story: short-term nominal interest rates have decreased sharply,
from 16 percent a year in 1992 to around 4 percent in 2001 (for the euro
area as a whole the numbers are 11 percent and 4 percent). Real short-
term interest rates (nominal interest rates minus realized inﬂation, mea-
sured using the GDP deﬂator) fell from 6 percent in 1992 to roughly zero
in 2001. (This is more than for the euro area as a whole, where real rates
fell from 7 percent to around 3 percent; in part because of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, inﬂation is higher in Portugal than the average for the
euro area.) 
Why the low interest rates? Apart from factors common to the OECD,
much of the decline is clearly traceable to ﬁnancial integration. Adoption
of the euro has eliminated country risk. And it has opened the euro inter-
bank loan market to Portuguese banks, a much more liquid market than the
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not want to face currency risk. The speciﬁc instrument Portuguese banks
have used has been international bonds issued through subsidiaries: the
yearly ﬂow of new international bond issues through these subsidiaries
increased from 6
1⁄2 billion in 1998 to 66 billion in 2000. The maturity of
these bonds (whose legal status is generally that of subordinated debt) is
between three and ﬁve years, and the currency of denomination is the euro.
Looking at the capital account shows the role that foreign borrowing
by domestic banks played in Portugal’s ﬁnancing of its current account
deﬁcit. The net foreign debt position of Portuguese banks has increased
from 610 billion in 1999 to 624 billion in 2001. In 2000 the increase in net
indebtedness of resident Portuguese banks was equal to 10.7 percent of
GDP—hence exceeding the current account deﬁcit in that year. (We are
not singling out banks arbitrarily here; all other portfolio and investment
ﬂows are small in comparison.)
Given the growth in mortgage loans, one would have expected the
increase in investment to reﬂect disproportionately an increase in housing
investment. Curiously, this is not the case. For most of the 1990s, housing
prices increased at a rate only slightly above inﬂation. Residential invest-
ment has remained a nearly constant fraction of total ﬁxed investment,
between 21 and 23 percent—a fact for which we have no explanation. 
Another apparently puzzling development, in view of the theory
sketched above, is the poor performance of foreign direct investment
(FDI). Net FDI, which had been an important source of capital inﬂows
following Portugal’s entry into the European Union in 1986, turned nega-
tive in 1995 and has remained negative since then. Here, looking at gross
ﬂows helps solve the puzzle. In the late 1980s, following EU accession,
FDI into Portugal had increased rapidly, reaching 4 percent of GDP in
1990. But thereafter the inﬂows slowed, reaching a near standstill in
1995. Since 1995, inﬂows have again increased, and in 2000 they stood at
twice their 1990 level (in dollars), the previous peak. Outﬂows, however,
which had been roughly unaffected by EU accession, have increased even
faster, reaching 5 percent of GDP in 2000. Thus the emergence of nega-
tive net FDI since 1995 is the outcome of a rapid increase in both inﬂows
and outﬂows, but with outﬂows increasing more rapidly than inﬂows. 
Most Portuguese direct investment abroad takes the form of acquisi-
tions, and much of it, 40 percent of all outﬂows, goes to Brazil. (Direct
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all outﬂows.) Our interpretation of this fact is that it is, somewhat para-
doxically, the result of ﬁnancial integration within the euro area, and of
the role that information plays in direct investment ﬂows. Our guess,
based on the large volume of euro-denominated bonds issued by Por-
tuguese ﬁrms, is that European direct investment in Brazil is carried out
mainly through Portugal, which presumably has a comparative advantage
in understanding business in that country. This comparative advantage is
not new. What is new, following the advent of the euro, is the ability of
Portuguese ﬁrms to raise funds in a euro area–wide capital market to
ﬁnance their foreign acquisitions. 
We see the picture that emerges from our description of trends in Por-
tugal as consistent with that from our panel data regressions. It is one in
which integration, especially ﬁnancial integration (rather than domestic
ﬁnancial liberalization), has led to lower saving and, to a lesser extent, to
higher investment. Together these have led to larger current account
deﬁcits. 
There is, however, an alternative view of the current account deﬁcit in
Portugal, one based on loss of competitiveness and currency overvalua-
tion. This view points to the decline in Portugal’s exports, due to their
unfavorable specialization. In 1999, clothing and footwear, goods that are
among the most exposed to competition from developing countries,
accounted for 20 percent of Portugal’s exports. According to this view,
the rate at which Portugal joined the euro, together with nominal rigidi-
ties, led to an overvalued currency, and this in turn has led to a current
account deﬁcit. 
Separating out the role of overvaluation from that of the mechanisms
we have focused on in this paper is far from straightforward, both concep-
tually and empirically. But we see the overall evidence in favor of over-
valuation as weak. First, from the trade balance side, most of the current
account deﬁcit is the reﬂection of an unusually high growth rate of
imports, rather than an unusually low growth rate of exports. Second, one
would expect overvaluation, and thus low demand for domestic goods, to
be associated with unusually slow GDP growth, yet this has not been the
case. Third, an index of Portuguese unit labor costs relative to twenty-two
industrial countries stood at 109.4 in 1995, and 103.8 in 1998, and is 108
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explaining Portuguese current account deﬁcits. 
Greece
Figure 8 shows Greek investment and saving, as percentages of GDP,
from 1981 to 2001. It shows that the divergence between investment and
saving is more recent there than in Portugal, dating back only to the
mid-1990s. 
Table 2 presents the basic numbers. One must again be careful about
the choice of a base period. Like Portugal, Greece went through a reces-
sion in the mid-1990s, and using that period as the base would therefore
be misleading. Thus, in presenting the data we divide the entire period
into three subperiods: 1981–91 (1991 was the last year of sustained
growth), with an average annual GDP growth rate of 2.5 percent;
1992–95, a period of slow growth, with an average growth rate of 0.8 per-
cent; and 1996–2001, a period of sustained growth, with an average
growth rate of 3.5 percent. To show recent developments, we also pre-
sent numbers for 2000 and 2001. When reporting changes, we compare
the numbers for 2000–01 with those for 1981–91. 
Greece is one of the countries for which the numbers reported by the
European Union differ the most from those reported by the OECD. There
are basically two time series for the Greek current account balance. The
series reported by the Bank of Greece, and used by the OECD, is mainly
based on information on international transactions collected by commer-
cial banks. The other series, used in the national accounts and by the
European Union, is mainly derived from customs and value-added tax
information. Both sources have become less reliable over time: the ﬁrst
because the removal of currency restrictions has reduced the information
available to commercial banks; the second because of the gradual elimi-
nation of customs controls on intra-EU trade. We report both sets of num-
bers in the ﬁrst two lines of table 2, but, for consistency with the numbers
for the other variables, we base the rest of our analysis (and ﬁgure 8) on
the EU numbers. Although the levels of the current account deﬁcit
according to the two sources are different, the increase in the deﬁcit is
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useful comparison: it increased from 100 to 130 over the 1995–2002 period.
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and 2.5 percent according to the OECD.
The numbers in the table are adjusted for inflation in the same way as
for Portugal.19 Again, the adjustment matters a lot: annual inflation has
decreased from 19.1 percent during 1981–91 to 12.4 percent during
1992–95 and 4.2 percent since 1996 (it stands at around 3 percent today).
Gross public debt increased from 35.9 percent of GDP in 1985 to 67 per-
cent in 1992. 
Figure 8 and table 2 suggest four conclusions:
—The increase in Greece’s current account deﬁcit does not reﬂect an
increase in investment. The ratio of investment to GDP in 2000–01 was
the same as in the base period, 1981–91. The proposition that entry into
European Monetary Union, and later the euro area, was accompanied by
an investment boom is only the result of an inappropriate comparison
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tion of government debt held by nonresident holders was low. Just as in Portugal, it has
recently increased, from 20 percent of total debt in 1997 to 45 percent in 2001.
Figure 8. Greece: Investment and Saving, 1981–2001a
Source: AMECO.
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tion that occurred then. 
—By implication, all of the 3.5-percentage-point increase in the cur-
rent account deﬁcit can be traced to a decrease in saving, which fell by
3.4 percentage points. 
—This decrease in saving is more than fully accounted for by an even
larger decrease in private saving, which fell by 7.7 percent of GDP,
whereas public saving increased by 4.3 percent of GDP. This is very dif-
ferent from the Portuguese experience: there, as table 1 showed, both
private and public saving decreased. In Greece the swing in (inﬂation-
adjusted) private saving has been twice as large as in Portugal but has been
partly offset by the increase in (also inﬂation-adjusted) public saving. 
—The decomposition of saving into corporate and household saving
can only be made from 1995 on. Based on this information, it appears that
much of the decrease in private saving comes from a decrease in retained
corporate earnings rather than a decrease in household saving. (Again, the
inﬂation correction is important, as inﬂation fell from 9 percent in 1995 to
about 3 percent in 2000. Omitting the inﬂation correction, the ratio of
household saving to GDP shows a decline of about 5 percentage points
from 1995 to 2000.)
We now look at some aspects of the story behind these numbers. The
decline in corporate saving reﬂects a clear shift in the ﬁnancing of ﬁrms
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Item 1981–91 1992–95 1996–2001 2000–2001 2000–01
Current accounta  –0.9  –0.2  –3.3  –4.4  –3.5
Current accountb –4.0  –1.4  –4.6  –6.5  –2.5
Investment 22.9  19.7  21.3  23.0  0.1
Saving 22.0  19.5  18.2  18.6  –3.4
Public 1.0  2.2  3.8  5.3  4.3
Private 21.0  17.3  14.4  13.3  –7.7
Private saving  1995 1997  2000
Household n.a. 6.8  7.6  6.7
Corporate n.a.  10.7 7.0  6.4
Sources: European Commission, Statistical Annex of European Economy, Spring 2002; data from the Bank of Greece.
a. European Union Annual Macroeconomic Database of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, ESA 95
basis.
b. OECD current account data, based on Bank of Greece ﬁgures.
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stock market went from zero in 1995–96 to 8 percent of GDP in 2001. A
plausible explanation is the stock market boom that lasted from early
1998 to the end of 1999. 
One might have expected the decrease in retained earnings to lead to an
increase in household saving (although this may be assuming too much
rationality on the part of stockholders). There was no such increase.
Household saving has remained ﬂat since 1995. The volume of consumer
loans, which equaled 1.6 percent of GDP in 1995, now equals 6 percent.
The volume of mortgage loans meanwhile has risen from 4.5 percent of
GDP to 12 percent. It is clear that, in contrast to Portugal, domestic ﬁnan-
cial liberalization is playing an important role here: consumer loans were
virtually prohibited until 1997. Financial integration in turn has allowed
this decrease in saving to show up as an increase in the current account
deﬁcit, rather than as a decrease in investment.20
In contrast to Portugal, net FDI ﬂows to Greece have remained positive
(but small). As in Portugal, however, small net ﬂows hide a more complex
reality. They are the result of Greek direct investment in the Balkan
region and the Mediterranean (over one-third of total Greek FDI), com-
pensated by direct investment in Greece from the rest of the European
Union. (Even gross ﬂows, however, are not very large, at around 3 per-
cent of GDP.) 
Finally, as in the case of Portugal, there is little evidence that the
increase in the Greek current account deﬁcit is primarily the result of a
lack of competitiveness, possibly arising from a too-strong exchange rate
for conversion of drachmas into euros. The index of Greek unit labor
costs relative to twenty-two industrial countries was 112 in 1995 and 119
in 1999 and is 111 in 2002.21
To summarize, the story for both Portugal and Greece is generally con-
sistent with the theme of the ﬁrst section of this paper and the panel data
evidence in the second section. Financial integration and ﬁnancial lib-
eralization have made it easier to borrow, and easier to borrow abroad.
The move to the euro appears important. The resulting elimination of
178 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
20. Isaac Sabethai of the Bank of Greece has suggested to us an alternative explanation
for the decrease in saving: with the increasing integration of Greece in the European Union
has come an attempt on the part of Greek consumers to catch up with EU consumption
standards.
21. European Economy, Spring 2002; again the base year is 1991.
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tuguese banks and to purchases of Greek government bonds by foreign
investors—the latter has become one of the largest items in the ﬁnancing
of the Greek current account deﬁcit. 
The effect on investment has been surprisingly limited. (The effect on
Portuguese investment of entry into the European Union in 1986 was
much stronger.) This suggests that it takes more than integration to
increase capital ﬂows—a conclusion often reached about FDI ﬂows 
in particular. FDI movements in both countries are interesting, with
increased gross ﬂows and geographic specialization but modest net ﬂows. 
The action appears to have occurred mostly through saving. Here it is
tempting, despite the obvious warnings about the interaction between
public and private saving, to link some of the differences across the two
countries to differences in public saving. One of the reasons why Greece
has a smaller current account deﬁcit than Portugal may be the fact that
Greece went through a substantial ﬁscal consolidation, whereas Portugal
did not. 
In this context it is interesting to note what has happened in Ireland.
Like Portugal and Greece, Ireland was once one of the poor countries of
the European Union: GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) in 1987
was about 70 percent of the EU average. Thanks to rapid growth since the
late 1980s, Ireland has more than fully caught up and now has a GDP per
capita 20 percent above the EU average.22 Yet during most of that period
Ireland has run a current account surplus, not a current account deﬁcit.
The proximate cause is a large increase in saving: from 1987 to 2000 Ire-
land’s ratio of saving to GDP increased from 16.2 percent to 24.1 percent,
roughly in line with the increase in the ratio of investment to GDP. In
turn, the proximate cause of this increase in saving was a large increase in
public saving. From 1987 to 2000 the government’s primary balance
shifted from a deﬁcit of 3.4 percent of GDP to a surplus of 5.5 percent.
Taking one step back, it is clear that this increase in public saving has
been the result of rapid economic growth—and thus high potential rev-
enue growth—and ﬁscal consolidation. This suggests that the difference
between Ireland and the other two relatively poor EU countries stems in
part from the differing trends in public saving, itself due in part to more
rapid GDP growth. 
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22. For an analysis of the Irish miracle see Honohan and Walsh (2002).
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We conclude by relating our ﬁndings to the long-standing puzzle ﬁrst
noted by Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka, namely, why investment
and saving rates within a country are so highly correlated both across time
and across countries, and by considering whether the high current account
deﬁcits of the poorer European countries have implications for their
macroeconomic policy. 
Back to the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle
Our ﬁndings are obviously closely related to the Feldstein-Horioka
puzzle and the subsequent research that has attempted to solve it. Our
ﬁndings of an increasing positive dependence of saving on income per
capita and a negative dependence of investment on income per capita
raise the possibility that this correlation between national saving and
national investment has decreased through time.23
With this in mind, we explore the relation between investment and sav-
ing across countries and time. We do so by running two sets of regres-
sions. First, we run conventional Feldstein-Horioka regressions of
investment on saving, over different periods:
where (I/Y)it and (S/Y)it are ratios of investment and saving to GDP,
respectively, in country i and year t. Table 3 shows the estimated values
for b, ﬁrst from estimation over the whole period 1975–2001, and then
over two subperiods, 1975–90 and 1991–2001, for each of our four
groups of countries. (For comparison with other studies, results are also
presented for the group of all OECD countries; that panel, however, is not
a balanced panel, because, again, observations for the Central European
countries from before 1990 are missing.)
(/) (/) , IY a bSY it it it =+ + ε
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23. The large literature triggered by the original paper (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980)
has pointed out that the high correlation is not necessarily a puzzle (see, for example, the
discussion in Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). Even in a fully integrated economy, in which
investment decisions do not depend on domestic saving, some shocks will move saving and
investment in the same direction, generating a positive correlation between the two. If these
shocks dominate, the correlation will be high. Our purpose here is to document what has
happened to this correlation over time and relate it to our ﬁndings, not to take a stand on
whether or not a puzzle exists.
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—The coefﬁcient in the original Feldstein-Horioka regression, run on a
sample of sixteen OECD countries over the period 1960–74, was 0.89.
When Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff ran the same regression on a
sample of twenty-two OECD countries over the period 1982–91, they
obtained a coefﬁcient of 0.62.24 Our results for the OECD as a whole give
a coefﬁcient of 0.58, with no evidence of a decline in the coefﬁcient over
time. 
—As we move from the OECD to the European Union and to the euro
area, however, the coefﬁcient steadily declines, suggesting steadily higher
degrees of integration. It also declines over time, reaching much lower
values in the 1990s. The coefﬁcient for the euro area for 1991–2001 is
only 0.14.25
To look at the evolution of the relation between investment and saving
more closely, we then run the following regression:
That is, we allow for both year effects and year-speciﬁc coefﬁcients on
saving. Figure 9 plots the time series for estimated bt for our four groups
of countries plus the OECD as a whole. The ﬁve panels conﬁrm and
amplify the results from table 3:
(/ ) (/) . IN a b SY it t t it it =+ + ε
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24. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
25. Part of this decrease may reﬂect not integration itself, but rather a side effect of
integration, namely, the adoption of similar national income accounts, such as the ESA
1995 norms for the European Union. Suppose, for example, that, before such adoption, one
country had high measured investment and saving, and another country had low measured
investment and saving. The cross-country correlation between investment and saving
across the two countries would be high. If, however, this high correlation reﬂected different
deﬁnitions of saving and investment, adoption of common accounting rules would make
the levels of saving and investment more similar, reducing the cross-country correlation.
Table 3. Estimated Feldstein-Horioka Coefﬁcients, 1975–2001a
OECD   European  Euro  Euro  
Period OECD minus Union area minus
1975–2001 0.58 0.51  0.47  0.35  0.39 
1975–1990 0.56  0.55  0.50  0.41 0.49 
1991–2001 0.57  0.38  0.36  0.14 0.26 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. Results of regressions of investment on saving, both as a percentage of GDP.
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Figure 9. Yearly Coefﬁcients of Investment on Saving from Panel Regressions,
1975–2000a
Source: AMECO.
a. Investment and saving are both expressed as a percentage of GDP.























1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 182—The coefﬁcient for the OECD as a whole does not show much of a
decline in bt over time, except in the second half of the 1990s, with a par-
tial reversal in 2001. 
—The coefﬁcient for OECD minus shows more of a steady decline
over the 1990s. The coefﬁcient at the end of the period is close to zero. 
—The coefﬁcients for the European Union and the euro area show an
inverse-U shape, with the coefﬁcient initially increasing from a value
close to zero in 1975, and then steadily declining from the late 1980s on.
The last panel, which shows the coefﬁcient for the euro minus group, does
not exhibit the low value of the coefﬁcient at the start, and so indicates
that the low initial value in the other panels comes again from the experi-
ence of Portugal and Ireland in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
—For the European Union and the euro area, the estimated coefﬁcient
is close to zero or even negative at the end of the 1990s. Our earlier results
suggest a natural interpretation: to the extent that investment and saving
depend with opposite signs on income per capita, and to the extent that
integration reinforces these two effects, the estimated coefﬁcient from a
regression of investment on saving may well be negative, and this may be
what we are observing at the end of the period. 
In short, for the countries of the European Union, and even more so for
the countries of the euro area, there no longer appears to be a Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle. In highly integrated regions, investment and saving
appear increasingly uncorrelated.26
Is Benign Neglect the Optimal Policy Response? 
So far, the attitude of both the European Commission and the European
Central Bank toward the Portuguese and Greek current account deﬁcits
has been one of benign neglect. The same attitude prevails in the United
States regarding the deﬁcits of individual states. Indeed, the current
account balances of individual states are not even recorded.27 Is the same
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26. Andrew Rose (2000, 2002) has argued that currency unions lead to a large increase
in gross trade ﬂows. Our ﬁndings can be seen as extending his, by showing that they also
allow for large increases in net trade ﬂows: countries belonging to a currency union trade
more and can run larger net positive or negative current account balances.
27. This is what made the study of Puerto Rico by Ingram we discussed earlier so inter-
esting. For some time after integration, Puerto Rico continued to collect the statistical
information needed to track its current and capital accounts.
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what theory tells us. 
First, if these current account deﬁcits had their origin in large ﬁscal
deﬁcits, issues of intergenerational distribution would obviously arise.
Greater government debt would mean higher taxes in the future, and thus
a larger burden on future generations. But in this case the issue is moot: as
we have seen, the current account deﬁcits have their origin in private sav-
ing and private investment. The consumers taking out mortgages in Portu-
gal are the ones who will have to repay them, not future generations. They
may be too optimistic about their future income prospects, but we do not
typically think of this as a reason for macroeconomic policy intervention. 
Even so, ever since the work of Peter Diamond on overlapping-genera-
tions economies,28 we know that, in a closed economy, individual saving
decisions may be privately optimal but still lead either to an inefﬁcient
aggregate outcome (in the case of dynamic inefﬁciency) or to one with
unappealing implications in terms of intergenerational distribution. If
today’s consumers save little, the capital stock will be smaller, and so will
be the income of future generations. Thus, in a closed economy, low pri-
vate saving may well justify government intervention on behalf of future
generations, for example in the form of higher public saving. 
This last argument becomes weaker, however, when the economy is
open.29 Consider, for example, the limiting case in which the economy is
open and fully integrated in world ﬁnancial markets, and the elasticity of
demand for domestic goods is inﬁnite—in effect, a “one-good” world.
Then the issue of intergenerational redistribution becomes irrelevant.
Saving decisions in the country have no effect on investment in the coun-
try, and thus no effect on future output or on the income of future genera-
tions. The same integration that leads to larger current account deﬁcits
also reduces their implications for intergenerational distribution. 
This limiting case is too strong, however. Even countries in the euro
area are short of being fully integrated and surely face downward-sloping
demand for their goods. And so, to the extent that large current account
deﬁcits today will require trade surpluses in the future, they also will
184 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
28. Diamond (1965).
29. See Buiter (1981) for an analysis of the overlapping-generations model in an open
economy.
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lower income (in terms of consumption) for future generations. In this
case the legacy of high current account deﬁcits is not low capital, but their
adverse effect on future terms of trade. This provides an argument for
higher public saving today, but that argument seems empirically weaker
than the standard closed-economy capital accumulation argument. 
Another line of argument relies on the presence of other market imper-
fections. The most obvious one, in the case of the euro area, is nominal
rigidities. Indeed, one of the standard problems in common currency areas
is that of adjustment of relative prices across countries. Granted the pres-
ence of nominal rigidities, the question is what implications this has in
this case. Let us again review the basic theory.
Under ﬂexible prices the increase in the current account deﬁcit comes
with a real appreciation, an increase in the relative price of domestic
goods. Later on, when the time comes to repay or service the increased
debt, the need to generate a trade surplus requires a real depreciation. 
If prices are rigid (or at least do not fully adjust), and output is deter-
mined by demand, the initial real appreciation will be less than would
take place under ﬂexible prices. The shifts in saving and investment we
discussed in the ﬁrst section of the paper will then lead to both an increase
in output above its natural level and a smaller current account deﬁcit than
would be the case under ﬂexible prices. 
How nominal rigidities affect what happens in the future depends on
the exact nature of these rigidities. If prices do not fully adjust in the
future when the time comes to repay or service the debt (a more doubtful
proposition than that in the previous paragraph, as this is both a slow and
a very predictable event), the attempts of consumers and ﬁrms to repay or
service the additional debt will, in the future, lead to a decrease in output
below its natural level—that is, to a recession—and through that mecha-
nism to the trade surplus needed to repay or service the debt. To the
extent that future prices can adjust, the trade surplus will be generated
through depreciation rather than a decrease in output. Because repay-
ment is likely to take place gradually (as opposed to the rapid repayment
required in currency crises), that case strikes us as a more reasonable
working hypothesis. 
Now let us turn to implications for ﬁscal policy (the Greek and the Por-
tuguese governments obviously have no control over monetary policy,
and because of the symmetry between current account surpluses and
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no reason to respond by changing monetary policy):
—If the governments of Portugal and Greece do not change their ﬁscal
stance, the shifts in saving and investment in response to integration will
lead to output in excess of its natural level. This in turn will lead to higher
inﬂation than in the rest of the euro area, and thus eventually generate the
required real appreciation.
—If those governments decide instead to maintain output at its natural
level, say, through higher public saving, they will, by implication, reduce
the current account deﬁcit. Under the assumption that the marginal propen-
sity to import is the same for all types of spending (consumption, invest-
ment, or government), the use of ﬁscal policy to maintain output at its
natural level will imply eliminating the current account deﬁcit altogether. 
—Only a formal quantitative model can tell us exactly what ﬁscal pol-
icy should be in this case. But it surely should not fully offset the increase
in private spending so as to maintain output at its natural level. This
would have the implication of largely or fully eliminating the current
account deﬁcit, thus losing one of the main beneﬁts of economic integra-
tion, namely, the ability to reallocate consumption and investment inter-
temporally. So, although benign neglect may not be optimal, it appears to
be a reasonable course of action. 
Should euro area members follow the example of U.S. states and stop
collecting current account statistics? Probably not, for at least three rea-
sons. First, the fact that European product markets are not yet fully inte-
grated implies that the changes in relative prices required to service or
repay the debt remain larger than in the United States. For this reason,
policymakers will want to know how much foreign debt a country is accu-
mulating. Second, the potential output costs of adjusting relative prices—
through a recession that reduces the inﬂation rate below the EU inﬂation
rate—is another reason to worry about the level of foreign debt. Finally,
euro area ﬁscal rules may prove weaker than those that stop U.S. states
from running large budget deﬁcits. In such a situation, knowing the effect
of the budget deﬁcit on the current account will be essential. 
186 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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Discussion
Willem H. Buiter: This paper by Olivier Blanchard and Francesco
Giavazzi addresses two distinct issues. The ﬁrst concerns the behavior of
the current account in a country that is undergoing greater international
ﬁnancial and trade integration while, starting from low levels of produc-
tivity and income per capita, catching up with, or converging on, the
higher productivity of its main trading partners. The paper argues, from
both theoretical considerations and empirical observation—based mainly
on the experience of countries that have joined or are about to join the
European Union and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)—that con-
vergence plus greater international integration means larger current
account deﬁcits in these countries. 
This issue is of particular interest to me because of my recent work in
and on the Central and Eastern European candidate countries for EU
accession. These ten countries moved very swiftly from almost perfect
ﬁnancial and trade autarky vis-à-vis the market economies outside the
Soviet bloc to a high degree of international ﬁnancial and trade integra-
tion with the West. They also started from low levels of income and pro-
ductivity per capita. In quite a few of these countries, especially the Baltic
states, large and persistent current account imbalances ﬁt the authors’
story—that of catch-up, integration, and (a worsening) current account, or
CICA—quite well.
Second, the paper argues that, as ﬁnancial and trade integration pro-
ceeds among a group of countries, we should see a greater uncoupling of
187
The opinions expressed are those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the
opinions of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
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puzzle becomes less puzzling. This applies not only to poorer, less devel-
oped countries but also to countries at comparable levels of development
and income per capita. 
My comments will deal only with the CICA nexus. Unlike the
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, the CICA nexus has important policy implica-
tions, relating to the assessment of whether current account imbalances
are sustainable. As regards Feldstein-Horioka, I will only state the view
that running regressions of the investment rate on the saving rate is one of
the more pointless exercises in open-economy macroeconometrics, even
when the regression includes time-varying parameters. There must be
fifty different ways to account for changes in the contemporaneous cor-
relation between saving and investment. No matter what pattern one
finds in the data, the questions “and?” and “so what?” are unavoidable.
For instance, a country could have a perfect positive correlation between
saving and investment while running a persistent current account deﬁcit
of 25 percent of GDP. And? So what? I will show that, in the authors’
model, perfect international ﬁnancial integration will produce a current
account balance that is always zero. Of course, the current account is like-
wise always zero if there is no international ﬁnancial integration at all.
catch-up, integration, and the current account. Rather few
explicit theoretical underpinnings are available to constrain the estimating
equations that can be taken to the data, and part of what is available does
not get used in the authors’ speciﬁcations. Only household saving is mod-
eled, and the current account surplus as a fraction of national income is
the same as the household saving rate. Household saving is driven by the
gap between current income and the present value of future income (or
between current income and permanent income). Because the logarithmic
utility function used by the authors has exactly offsetting income and sub-
stitution effects, a lower interest rate reduces saving only through a valu-
ation effect: a lower discount rate increases the present value of future
income, as long as future income is positive.
Formally, consumption in period 1 by residents of country k is given by 
() , , , , 1
1
2
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k is the present value in period 1 of household lifetime resources
in country k.1 Let Yj,k, j = 1,2; k = 1,…, N be the endowment in period j of
country k (that is, country k’s GDP) and Pj,k the price of that endowment
in terms of the composite consumption good. With a completely non-
diversiﬁed portfolio of real assets—the only case the authors consider—
only residents of country k can possess title to country k’s endowment
stream. The present value of household lifetime resources in country k is
given by 
Equations 1 and 2 and the general-equilibrium solutions for Pj,k, j = 1,2
and R imply that country k’s current account surplus as a fraction of
national income in period 1 is given by the last expression in equation 3:
Higher output in the rest of the world than in country k improves coun-
try k’s terms of trade (that is, raises the relative price of country k’s out-
put). Increased trade integration is modeled as an increase in σ, the
(absolute value of the) price elasticity of demand for country k’s output,
assumed to exceed 1. It is clear that a higher domestic growth rate relative
to the foreign growth rate, a smaller wedge x (the authors’ metric for devi-
ations from full ﬁnancial integration), and a higher σ (the authors’ metric
for the degree of international trade integration) all are associated with a
smaller current account surplus or a larger deﬁcit. These results are not,
however, robust to relaxing the assumption of unitary elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. A sufﬁciently low intertemporal elasticity of
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1. If the instantaneous utility function were of the constant elasticity of intertemporal
substitution type, the ﬁrst-period consumption function would be 
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deﬁcit or a larger surplus.2
If we add investment to the model, a reduction in the wedge is likely to
raise investment in most conventional models of investment. If low out-
put per capita is due to a shortage of capital, and if the marginal produc-
tivity of capital decreases with the capital-labor and capital-output ratios,
we would expect to see a higher rate of investment in poorer countries.
Under these conditions, investment therefore reinforces the effect of
reductions in x and greater trade integration on the current account oper-
ating through the saving channel. 
The authors argue, correctly, that EU membership has made for greater
trade and ﬁnancial integration for those countries that are members. For
late-joining EU members that started off at a much lower level of output
per capita than the existing EU average, such as Portugal, Greece, and
especially Ireland, rapid catch-up growth would be expected. EMU mem-
bership further reduces the wedge and increases the substitutability
between domestic and foreign goods. All these factors make for larger
current account deﬁcits in the new members. In addition, increased inter-
national ﬁnancial integration was accompanied by domestic ﬁnancial lib-
eralization. This, too, may reduce private saving.
The issue has important policy implications. If we can quantify the
equilibrium (and optimal) current account deﬁcits of countries in the
process of real convergence, domestic and international policymakers
will gain important guidance about when actual current account deﬁcits
become excessive or even unsustainable. Those would be very useful
benchmarks, for instance, for the ten EU accession candidates from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. Such quantitative benchmarks were not part of
this paper, however. 
ﬁnancial integration: beyond the x-factor. The authors adopt
a narrow perspective on international ﬁnancial integration. Formally,
greater integration is captured exclusively by a reduction in the wedge
190 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
2. In the case of constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the current account sur-
plus would be given by  If
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution µ is sufﬁciently below 1, a lower value of the
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return to saving and the cost of capital in the domestic economy. It is true
that in the European Union, and a fortiori in EMU, risk-free nominal rates
have converged. However, modeling ﬁnancial integration as a reduction
in x has two weaknesses.
First, although greater ﬁnancial integration may well reduce the cost of
capital for domestic investors (enterprises) in countries that are catching
up, it is not at all obvious that it would also reduce the risk-adjusted
expected rate of return available to domestic savers. Lack of international
ﬁnancial integration tends to go hand in hand with domestic ﬁnancial
underdevelopment and ﬁnancial repression, including large spreads
between domestic borrowing and lending rates. These spreads reﬂect
domestic monopoly power, risk that cannot be diversiﬁed effectively
within the domestic economy, and high intermediation costs resulting
from suboptimal scale, organizational slack, and X-inefﬁciency (not
x-inefﬁciency!) in domestic ﬁnancial institutions and markets. It is quite
possible that ﬁnancial integration would raise the risk-adjusted real rate of
return to domestic savers at the same time that it reduces the cost of capi-
tal for enterprises engaged in domestic capital formation. In the authors’
model, private saving would increase with greater international ﬁnancial
integration. 
It would not have been difﬁcult to address directly what are empirical
issues about movements over time in rates of return to saving and in the
cost of capital, and about the interest sensitivity of private saving and
investment in countries engaged in catch-up. It is unclear why the authors
did not do so and instead opted to bundle untested hypotheses about these
two issues and many other issues into the composite hypothesis that is
ultimately taken to the data.3
Second, international ﬁnancial integration is not just about more efﬁ-
cient intertemporal trade. It also permits more effective international risk
sharing. It might appear that including enhanced diversiﬁcation among
the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration would strengthen the negative effect
on private saving of greater ﬁnancial integration. If the private sector is
not only risk-averse but also cautious or prudent, there will be a motive
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3. For household saving to tell us all we need to know about private saving, we must be
in a Modigliani-Miller world where the corporation is only a veil. For private saving to tell
us all we need to know about national saving, we must be in a world with debt neutrality or
Ricardian equivalence, where government borrowing is only a veil.
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cause household saving to decline.4
More advantageous intertemporal trade and precautionary saving do
not exhaust the list of possible effects of ﬁnancial integration on private
saving behavior. Full ﬁnancial integration would allow national con-
sumers to diversify their portfolios, including their ownership claims on
real resources such as national endowment streams (equity). In the
authors’ model each country specializes in the production of a single good,
and the residents of a country own, in addition to the internationally
traded risk-free ﬁnancial asset, only their own country’s endowment
stream. This is an extreme form of home bias in the equity portfolio. In a
risky world the risk-averse residents of a country would not put all their
equity eggs into one basket. If all equity were traded, there would exist a
“pooling equilibrium,” as described by Robert Lucas, in which each coun-
try’s residents would own a share of the world portfolio.5 If each coun-
try’s consumers hold the world portfolio, then in the formal model
considered in the paper, differences in growth rates between domestic
outputs would not affect the consumers of different countries differently,
nor would changes in σ or any other shock, and there would be no effect
on current accounts. Thus the achievement of full international ﬁnancial
integration (including unrestricted international risk sharing) could break
any link between national growth rates and national saving rates. The
CICA nexus vanishes. This is easily demonstrated formally. 
Let the shares of country j’s endowment in periods 1 and 2 owned by
residents of country k be denoted αk,j and βk,j, respectively. If completely
unrestricted international portfolio diversiﬁcation were possible, the pres-
ent value of the lifetime resources of country k’s households would be
The extreme home bias case considered by the authors given in equation
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4. See, for example, Kimball (1990) and Parker and Preston (2002). The logarithmic
utility function in the authors’ example exhibits caution, as the third derivative of the
instantaneous utility function is positive.
5. Lucas (1982).
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income for country k in period 1 is P1,kY1,k. The current account surplus of
country k, as a fraction of national income, is given by 
Consider the special case of international portfolio diversiﬁcation
where the representative consumer in country k holds a constant fraction
of the world portfolio, that is, a claim to a common, constant fraction of
each country’s endowment in both periods: αk,i =β k,i =α k > 0. The current
account balance of country k in period 1 then becomes 
Note that  where g* is the growth factor of world real
output (measured in units of the composite consumption good). The
global capital market equilibrium gives us R = 1 + g*. Country k’s current
account balance is therefore given by
The interest rate wedge x experienced by country k has been tagged
onto the model of Stanley Fischer and Jacob Frenkel in an ad hoc manner
that does not address general-equilibrium considerations.6 There is no
counterpart anywhere else in the world economy to country k’s x. It is not
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6. Fischer and Frenkel (1974).
1017-03 BPEA/Blanchard  12/31/02  9:52  Page 193clear whether x represents a real resource cost to the world economy as a
whole or a transfer from borrowers to lenders, or who bears any real
resource cost or receives the transfer. We are not given enough informa-
tion to determine whether the way in which x is added to the Fischer-
Frenkel model represents a proper or an improper use of the small-country
assumption. With x = 0, country k’s current account surplus for the stock
market economy (an economy in which claims to all endowment streams
are traded) is given by the following transparent (and testable) expression:
I recognize that, for a perfectly pooled risk-sharing equilibrium to
exist, all assets would have to be traded, including human capital. In prac-
tice we continue to observe a marked, albeit slowly diminishing, home
bias in most countries as regards the ownership of stocks and shares.7
Human capital cannot be traded, for legal reasons, either within countries
or across national boundaries.8 We are a long way from a global pooling
equilibrium.
Nevertheless, the extent of international risk sharing is increasing
steadily. For the ten countries scheduled to become members of the Euro-
pean Union in 2004, the opportunity for their pension funds to access the
EU-wide  ﬁnancial markets represents a big step away from ﬁnancial
autarky. 
The implications of increasing ﬁnancial integration are clearly not
exhausted by a consideration of what happens to x. Greater ﬁnancial inte-
gration would also have to include a move from a situation where αk,k =
βk,k = 1 and αk,j =β k,j = 0, k ≠ j to one where αk,k, βk,k < 1 and αk,j, βk,j > 0,
for at least some k ≠ j.
the empirics of the CICA hypothesis. The main empirically esti-
mated relationship differs in important ways from equations 2 and 3,
unless a number of auxiliary and untested (but testable) conditions are
met: 
() . 80 1 ca
k =
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7. See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).
8. Private investors could, however, trade synthetic (contingent) claims whose payoffs
could replicate those of GDP or of labor income. (See, for example, Shiller and Schneider,
1998, and Shiller and Athanasoulis, 2000.)
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cation of the estimating equation that includes as regressors either the
world real interest rate, the wedge x and the gap between current income
per capita and permanent income per capita in country k, or the wedge x
and the gaps between current income and permanent income in country k
and in its trading partners. Of these we ﬁnd only country k’s current
income per capita relative to the average income per capita of its trading
partners. It is unlikely that the omitted variables—either the world real
rate of interest, the wedge x and permanent income (or its proxy) in coun-
try k, or the wedge and the gap between permanent income in country k
and average permanent income in the trading partners—are orthogonal to
the included regressors. The resulting estimates are therefore likely to be
both biased and inconsistent. Using the initial net foreign asset position of
a country to capture the missing variables requires maintaining too many
further untested hypotheses to be helpful. 
It is especially troubling that the authors have decided to maintain the
assumption of convergence of country k’s productivity level toward that
of its trading partners.9 Convergence could and should have been tested
for the countries in the sample using the available data on output per
capita. The evidence reported in the “conditional convergence” literature
on convergence within the group of OECD (or the EU, or the EMU) coun-
tries is mixed at best.10 One could very easily reject equation 9 even if the
authors’ model of saving (and investment) is correct, and one could
accept equation 9 even if the authors’ assumptions about saving and
investment behavior are incorrect. Although I recognize that any statisti-
cal test is subject to type I and type II errors, I would still insist on warn-
ing against type III errors, that is, not being sure as to exactly what is
being tested, because of too many jointly maintained hypotheses. Because
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9. The growth rate of output in country k is included among the additional regres-
sors  Xkt, but it is given a cyclical rather than a longer-term catch-up or convergence
interpretation.
10. See Quah (1993a and b), Bernard and Durlauf (1996), and Durlauf and Quah
(1999).
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authors’ key hypothesis, namely, that ﬁnancial and trade liberalization
implies larger current account deﬁcits for converging countries, and that
EU accession and EMU membership are examples of this mechanism at
work. I believe they are correct, but this paper does not contain any robust
evidence to support the claim. The more detailed narratives of the Greek
and Portuguese experience since their EU accession ﬁt the CICA mecha-
nism. Ireland provides an emphatic rejection. Further work, bringing the-
ory and empirics closer together, is required. 
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas: This is a very nice paper. It is simple and
intuitive and elegantly ﬁts an interesting fact to the theory. Blanchard and
Giavazzi argue that large current account deﬁcits in Portugal and Greece,
two small and relatively poor members of the European Union, are
exactly what the neoclassical growth model predicts should happen when
such economies integrate their ﬁnancial and goods markets with the rest
of the world. And that these large deﬁcits are not cause for worry.
Why should current account deﬁcits in poorer countries increase with
integration? Theory emphasizes two channels:
—Faster conditional convergence and catch-up: Financial market
integration, coupled with monetary union, reduces the cost of capital and
eliminates currency risk. Cheap capital stimulates investment, while low
interest rates and increased future wealth lower saving. Meanwhile prod-
uct market integration reduces the adverse terms-of-trade effect that
accompanies the need to generate a given trade surplus in the future,
effectively making borrowing even cheaper.
—Productivity catch-up: Through increased competition or better dis-
cipline, integration improves domestic total factor productivity (TFP),
which increases the country’s growth prospects.
The authors present evidence that largely supports the theory: the
dispersion of current account deficits across European countries has
increased in the last five years. Poorer European countries tend to run
larger deficits, and more so now than in the past, so that, finally, the high
correlation between national saving and private investment—the
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle—has largely disappeared for this group of
countries. The authors provide detailed evidence for Portugal and Greece
that emphasizes the importance of financial integration working through
196 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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credit constraints on firms (Greece).
The paper provides a very convincing account and delivers a welcome
piece of good news. After all, many emerging market economies have
experienced a rather bumpy ride as they liberalized their goods and ﬁnan-
cial markets. Globalization, it seems, has not been a smooth process. Evi-
dence that the standard theory performs well, at least for some European
countries, is therefore reassuring. It leads to the natural conclusion that
the gains from integration are there and that they should be driven by the
channels mentioned above: conditional convergence and productivity
catch-up. It also underlies the authors’ normative conclusion that the
recent current account developments are—to a ﬁrst order—optimal.
My comments will address each point in turn. First, I will argue that
conditional convergence and productivity catch-up have quite different
welfare implications. In particular, the estimated welfare beneﬁts from
conditional convergence are relatively small for Portugal and Greece
compared with the potential beneﬁts from productivity catch-up.
Second, I will show that more is at play than the simple conditional
convergence story. Productivity growth in Greece and Portugal has been
faster than in other European countries. More generally, poorer OECD
countries have experienced faster TFP growth. This strengthens the argu-
ment for laissez-faire, since productivity growth provides ﬁrst-order wel-
fare gains.
Third, to the extent that income per capita converges among members
of the European Union, a central implication of the theory is that greater
cross-country dispersion in current accounts should be matched by lower
income inequality. Here the data do not oblige: the evidence indicates that
income inequality has increased, not decreased, over the recent past. This
casts some doubts on the mechanism that the paper emphasizes.
All this indicates that the normative conclusions that the authors reach
may not be warranted. Large current account deﬁcits, even when a con-
sequence of credible ﬁnancial integration, may lead to situations of illi-
quidity. Some strictly positive amount of insurance, in the form of a
government surplus, may be necessary.
conditional convergence and the beneﬁts of open capital
markets. The paper emphasizes the beneﬁts of both product and ﬁnan-
cial market integration. Yet it should be clear that ﬁnancial integration is
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paper insofar as it facilitates intertemporal lending and borrowing.
So we may ask a simple question: how much beneﬁt can a small, open
economy like Portugal or Greece reap from ﬁnancial integration? In the
standard neoclassical growth framework, open ﬁnancial markets bring
about faster convergence toward a country-speciﬁc steady state. How
beneﬁcial is this conditional convergence? As it turns out, this simple
question has a simple answer: not very.
To understand why, consider two extreme scenarios. First, consider a
small, open economy under ﬁnancial autarky, with no intertemporal trade.
Alternatively, think of the same economy as a ﬁnancially integrated econ-
omy with perfect and frictionless capital mobility. The latter scenario, of
course, involves potentially very large current account deﬁcits. The wel-
fare difference between the two scenarios should set an upper bound on
the true welfare gains that can accrue to a country like Portugal or Greece;
after all, neither country was in a state of ﬁnancial autarky before adopt-
ing the euro, nor is either currently experiencing unfettered capital ﬂows.
To measure this upper bound, one needs only some estimate of the cur-
rent and steady-state levels of physical and human capital per capita. Such
estimates are provided and discussed in work I have done with Olivier
Jeanne.1 Using these estimates, table 1 below reports compensating varia-
tion for twenty OECD countries as of 1995. Compensating variation
measures the constant fraction of annual consumption that the typical
household would have to give up to be indifferent between financial inte-
gration and financial autarky. For Greece this compensating variation is
about 0.76 percent of annual consumption. The figure for Portugal is
larger, at 2.67 percent. Those numbers are quite representative: compen-
sating variation averages 0.91 percent of consumption for all countries in
the sample, and it ranges from 0.10 percent for Norway to Portugal’s
2.67 percent.
How should we think of these numbers? I would argue that they are
quite small. First, they are upper bounds on the true welfare beneﬁts, and
they are likely to be considerably smaller after adjustment costs, incen-
tives, and intertemporal terms-of-trade effects are factored in. Second,
even when taken at face value, they are small compared with the welfare
beneﬁts from, for instance, productivity improvements or the elimination
198 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
1. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002).
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alone, ﬁnancial integration is unlikely to remove domestic distortions or
inefﬁciencies. This result weakens Blanchard and Giavazzi’s claim: if this
is all that is going on, we should not worry about large current account
deﬁcits because they do not matter much for welfare, just as it does not
matter much for welfare whether the capital account is open or closed.
domestic efﬁciency gains in portugal and greece. Of course,
conditional convergence is not the whole story. EU members exhibit con-
vergence in income per capita. Equivalently, we observe a productivity
catch-up. A simple look at labor productivity and TFP over the second
half of the 1990s conﬁrms that productivity growth is an important part of
the story. Table 2 reports labor productivity for 1991–95 and 1996–2000
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Table 1. Compensating Variation in Selected
OECD Countries, 1995
Percent of consumption



















United Kingdom  1.08
United States  1.20
Source: Author’s calculations from data in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002).
a. Share of annual consumption that the typical household would have to
forgo in order to be indifferent between full ﬁnancial integration and full ﬁnan-
cial autarky.
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and Greece experienced strong labor productivity growth (at least 3 per-
cent a year) between 1996 and 2000. When one compares 1991–95 with
1996–2000, it is also clear that Portugal and Greece (and Ireland) did
break away from the pack. TFP also rose sharply in Ireland and Portugal,
but less sharply in Greece.3
More systematic analysis ﬁnds strong evidence that productivity
growth in OECD countries is linked—negatively—to the initial level of
development. Regressing TFP growth from 1965 to 1995 on the initial
level of output per capita, I obtain the following results:
OECD 
∆ ln Ai = 7.36 – 0.71 ln (Y/L)i +ε i
(1.62) (0.17)
Adjusted R2 = 0.47, n = 20
200 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
3. Unfortunately, more recent numbers are not available on a consistent basis across
countries.





Country 1991–95 1996–2000 1990–95
Ireland 2.7 4.0 5.4
Portugal 2.3 3.5 2.3
Greece 0.7 3.0 1.5
Finland 3.2 2.7 –0.3
Sweden 2.8 2.2 n.a.
Austria 1.9 2.1 2.0
United States 1.3 2.1 0.2
Belgium 1.6 1.7 1.0
Denmark 2.2 1.5 6.8
Japan 0.6 1.5 0.4
United Kingdom 2.7 1.5 1.1
France 1.2 1.3 0.9
Netherlands 1.0 1.1 1.7
Italy 1.8 0.9 0.6
Spain 2.0 0.9 1.8
Source: Author’s calculations from data in European Economy, 2002, and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002). 
a. Countries are listed in descending order of 1996–2000 labor productivity. Data are simple annual averages. 
Labor productivity
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∆ ln Ai = 0.92 – 0.09 ln (Y/L)i +ε i
(1.31) (0.15)
Adjusted R2 =–0.01, n = 43.
These results indicate that low initial levels of output per capita are
associated with faster TFP growth among the OECD countries. No such
pattern is present for the non-OECD countries. This evidence in favor of
productivity gains reinforces the message of the paper: after all, if poorer
countries are also catching up in terms of TFP, so much the better, and the
associated current account deﬁcits should be even less of a concern.
One is left wondering, however, where these productivity gains are
coming from. The paper mentions increased goods market competition
and market discipline. Yet the discussion of Portugal and Greece does not
revisit the issue as extensively. So we are left wanting more: is it purely a
ﬁnancial story whereby access to the international bond market (Portugal)
or  ﬁnancial disintermediation (Greece) improves the efﬁciency of the
domestic ﬁnancial sector? Does it have to do with increased competition
in goods markets? or with the discipline effect? These are important—and
difﬁcult—questions to answer.
current account deﬁcits, cross-country output, and catch-
up. Take as given that the euro area countries are converging in terms of
the level of GDP per capita, as suggested by the previous evidence.
According to the neoclassical growth model, the cross-sectional variance
for the logarithm of output per capita at time t, σ2
yt, should follow 
where σ2
ut represents the variance of unexpected changes in preferences or
production conditions across countries at time t, and β is the “speed of con-
vergence” taken from the neoclassical growth model.4 This σ-convergence
expresses the idea that we should expect to see less and less dispersion in
output per capita as countries converge to their common steady state. For
present purposes, observe that any factor that speeds up convergence (that
is, increases β) should also lead to a faster decline in the cross-country
σσ σ
β
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the population growth rate, and the depreciation rate.
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ﬁnancial and product market integration should lead simultaneously to an
increasing dispersion, in the cross section, of the ratio of current account
to GDP, and a decline in the dispersion of log output per capita.
Is this implication supported by the data? Figure 1 below reports the
cross-country dispersion of log output per capita since 1975 for the
OECD, the European Union, and the euro area, as deﬁned in the paper.
One can see a large decline in this measure of income inequality for all
three groups, especially for the European Union and the euro area, where
it has fallen from a peak of 0.32 in 1984 to a trough of 0.23 in 1997. At
ﬁrst glance, this massive reduction in income inequality appears consis-
tent with the convergence hypothesis just described. Most of this decline
can in fact be traced to the growth performance of only three countries:
Ireland, Spain, and Portugal.
However, when we examine the joint evolution of output per capita and
the ratio of the current account balance to GDP, the evidence appears less
trenchant. Figure 2 is a scatterplot, for the euro area, of the cross-country
dispersion in the ratio of the current account to GDP against income
inequality. The ﬁgure shows three distinct phases. In the early 1980s the
dispersion of current account balances was very large, reﬂecting the large
budget deﬁcits in Portugal and Ireland. From 1985 to roughly 1995 there
was a massive reduction in income inequality, without any signiﬁcant
change in the dispersion of current account positions. Lastly, from 1996 to
2001 there was a large increase in current account dispersion, accompa-
nied by a modest yet signiﬁcant increase in income inequality.
5 This last
segment is the focus of the paper. Yet the associated increase in income
inequality contradicts the view that convergence is driving the process. A
look at the time plot of log GDP per capita for the EU countries (ﬁgure 3)
conﬁrms that convergence seems to have stopped, except for Ireland, over
the period when current account deﬁcits were driven apart.
Of course, it is possible that country-speciﬁc shocks were sufﬁciently
large to counteract the convergence process and drive incomes per capita
apart over that period. However, one is left wondering what exactly these
shocks were.6
202 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
5. The regression coefﬁcient of the ﬁtted line is 234.41, with a standard error of 69.78.
The adjusted R2 is 67 percent.
6. Figure 3 suggests that the answer is not that Germany’s output per capita fell after
reuniﬁcation. One obtains the same results if Germany is excluded from the sample.
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suggests that we should look at the components of the current account for
further insight. Blanchard and Giavazzi state that “The channel [for the
increased external deﬁcit] appears to be primarily a decrease in saving—
typically private saving . . . rather than an increase in investment.” 
According to the paper’s table 1, private saving in Portugal decreased
by 5.6 percent of GDP from 1985–91 to 2000–01. In Greece private sav-
ing decreased by 7.7 percent of GDP between 1981–91 and 2000–01
(table 2). By contrast, investment increased in Portugal by a modest 2.8
percent of GDP and remained more or less constant in Greece. In both
countries public saving is not an essential part of the story.
The experience of these two countries—up to this point—is very remi-
niscent of that of many Latin American countries that have adopted
exchange rate–based stabilization programs.7 Stabilization of the
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Figure 1. Cross-Country Standard Deviations of Output per Capita, 1975–2000a
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euphoria at the prospect of steady future growth combined to generate a
strong consumption boom—that is, a decline in saving—which may or
may not have been accompanied by an investment boom. Growth was ini-
tially solid and everything looked benign. Over time, however, clouds
gathered on the horizon: the currency appreciated in real terms, competi-
tiveness plummeted, and foreign investors became worried as growth per-
formance failed to meet expectations. The endgame is well known: with a
ﬁxed exchange rate, restoring competitiveness required an adjustment in
relative prices. Often this was too little and too late. Eventually capital
pulled out, forcing a devaluation.
European countries, too, have experienced similar dynamics in the
past. For instance, France’s experiment with “competitive disinﬂation”
presents a number of similarities: a strong peg, a currency that appreci-
204 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
Figure 2. Cross-Country Standard Deviations of Current Account–GDP Ratios and
of Growth in Output per Capita, Euro Area, 1980–2001
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Blanchard and Giavazzi, this volume.
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ances, a failure of wage and price moderation to restore competitiveness,
and eventually an abrupt adjustment at the time of the 1992 crisis in the
exchange rate mechanism.8
How do these episodes differ from the current situation in Portugal and
Greece, and what lessons do they offer? I see two important differences.
First, the Latin American countries in the early 1990s and the European
countries in the late 1980s had a checkered inﬂation record. As a conse-
quence, the real appreciation was relatively rapid. Inﬂation inertia was
key to that process. Portugal and Greece today are in a different situation:
there is virtually no risk that inﬂation will get out of control. Yet their
strong economic performance, as well as the impact of convergence on
the price of nontraded goods (the Balassa-Samuelson effect), implies that
one can expect higher inﬂation in both countries than in the rest of the
euro area. Annual consumer price inﬂation in September 2002 was
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Figure 3. Output per Capita in the EU Countries, 1975–2001a
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for the euro area as a whole.9
Taken together, these considerations imply that real overvaluation may
happen relatively slowly in Portugal and Greece. But there are signs that
it is coming. In time, this will require an adjustment in relative prices,
which may prove painful.
Second, to the extent that both countries belong to European monetary
union, there is no escape clause: the risk of devaluation is also nonexis-
tent. This means fewer reasons for ﬁnancial markets to worry. Indeed, the
fact that neither Portugal’s nor Greece’s debt carries substantial spreads
over that of other European countries can be taken as a sign of market
conﬁdence in these countries’ ability to honor their international obliga-
tions. But this does not mean that capital cannot or will not pull out. Even
with a relatively evenly distributed maturity structure, markets could
refuse to ﬁnance additional increases in debt. At current levels this would
mean a sudden stop on the order of 5–7 percent of GDP, which would
surely raise the specter of default. In other words, although a common
currency may eliminate concerns that capital ﬂight will force a devalua-
tion, it does not ensure against situations of illiquidity.
What should governments do? Certainly, provision of full insurance is
unwarranted. As the authors argue, this would completely eliminate the
beneﬁts of greater integration. But it seems that no insurance at all is not
the answer either. This discussion teaches us that there is some, probably
strictly positive level of insurance that governments should purchase: a
buffer, in the form of a larger government surplus, would prove useful
should markets become less conﬁdent.
General discussion: Christopher Sims argued that although European
monetary union is indeed relaxing the current account constraints on indi-
vidual member countries, it remains important to keep track of those
countries’ current accounts. Opening up capital markets in poor countries
has often led initially to large inﬂows and later to ﬁnancial problems as
the inﬂows shift balance sheets, alter the nature of institutions, and ulti-
mately create systemic problems. He suggested that the European mone-
tary authorities ought to be looking carefully at balance sheets and
ﬁnancial institutions in countries such as Portugal. Sims did not consider
206 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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placency. He observed that, in the early history of U.S. ﬁnancial integra-
tion, some states defaulted on their sovereign external debt. 
William Nordhaus found that the analysis of the euro area economies
provided a useful test of the Feldstein-Horioka idea that the high correla-
tion, observed in the past, between domestic saving and domestic invest-
ment reﬂected imperfect capital markets. William Brainard suggested that
it was important to distinguish, on the one hand, the short-term effects on
the capital account and investment arising from improved efﬁciency of
international capital markets from, on the other, the way in which the
improved capital markets affect the correlation between domestic shocks
and capital inﬂows. He agreed with Willem Buiter that, in theory, the lat-
ter effects are nonmonotonic. With either complete autarky or perfect
international diversiﬁcation, a shock to earnings on domestic capital
would have negligible effects on the capital account. With perfect diversi-
ﬁcation, foreigners would own almost all of a small country’s domestic
capital, and domestic savers would have almost all of their capital
invested abroad. A domestic shock to the earnings of capital would have
little effect on the capital account or even on domestic consumption.
Between these two extremes the capital account serves as a partial buffer
to domestic shocks. Brainard thought that the real world was far from
having perfect capital markets, and that reducing the costs of moving cap-
ital across national boundaries would result in greater capital ﬂows in
response to shocks. He also reinforced the point, originally made by Jef-
frey Sachs, that the Feldstein-Horioka “puzzle” could appear even with a
high degree of capital mobility. For example, a transitory shock affecting
both domestic income and the marginal product of capital would affect
both domestic saving and domestic investment. 
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